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interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favorable economic 
institutions in form of a social contract that ensures a state of law and the absence of societal 
conflict are not assumed exogenously under certain political systems, but arise in equilibrium. 
We study the conditions under which a state of law can be implemented under oligarchy, and 
when democratization is necessary. Economic inequality is the main determinant of 
economic and political institutions. In turn, institutions shape the income distribution. 
Simulations illustrate how inequality affects the development process and may lead to 
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1 Introduction
The importance of institutions for economic development is well recognized. A vast literature
studies the economic consequences of the different political institutions regulating the limits of
political power and the aggregation of individual preferences.1 An important finding is that
political institutions affect social interactions, the resolution of conflicts of interests, and play an
important role in shaping economic outcomes. Another strand of the literature highlights the role
of economic, rather then political, institutions, and in particular the role of well functioning legal
systems and the existence of a state of law, as a primary determinant of economic development.2
Also, there exists an increasing awareness that economic and political institutions themselves
evolve endogenously and are affected by economic forces and long term development.
In this paper we propose a theory which studies the distinctive roles of economic institutions
and political systems in the process of development, and the role of economic inequality and
long-term development as both a determinant and a result of institutional change. We address
the issue by modelling economic and political institutions as intrinsically different but interacting
domains. Formally, we provide a stylized model which relates to the metaphors proposed by
Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) where a favorable environment of
economic institutions is interpreted as a ’social contract’, or state of law, characterized by
limited conflict in society. Conversely, when society falls into a ’state of nature’, resources are
wasted in economy-wide conflict and universal expropriating activities. In the model we study
the conditions under which efficient economies can emerge in equilibrium under different political
regimes. In particular, we consider democracy with universal franchise as opposed to limited
franchise under oligarchy. In each regime, political power allows the enfranchised population
to decide about income redistribution but without having the possibility to ex-ante commit
over political actions. Conditional on the political system, the social contract, or the absence
of it, is the equilibrium outcome of a simple conflict game played between well defined social
groups. In particular, we consider a simple conflict game in which groups can decide to invest in
”arming” or abstain from it, but where the cost of conflict is given. This conflict model is nested
1This includes, among others, investigations of the effects of the political system (democracy or not), the role
of voting systems, of the form of government, or of the form of state to name a few, on various governmental
activities and economic performance in general. See e.g. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) as well as two
recent books by Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for surveys of theories and empirical
evidence.
2For example Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) emphasize the crucial role of economic, particularly legal, for economic
well-being and also stress the role of the social environment.
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in a simple growth model in which economic inequality changes overtime. At each moment in
time, the political and economic institutions emerge as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the game played among the members of different groups in society. As a result, good economic
institutions, i.e. a social contract, can be sustained if and only if no individual has incentives to
deviate and invest in arms and conflictual activities.
The model predicts that a social contract can be sustained in equilibrium under different
political systems. Inequality in resource endowments and incomes, which is closely linked to the
level of development of the economy in our model, is the crucial determinant of political and
economic institutions. In particular, we find that if inequality is sufficiently high, the economy
can sustain a social contract only under the rule of an oligarchic elite, with all members of society
optimally obeying to this system, paralleling Hobbes’ Leviathan. In contrast, if inequality is
sufficiently low, a social contract can only be supported under democracy. For intermediate
levels of inequality a state of nature, characterized by widespread conflict, can represent the
unique equilibrium. In this situation no social contract is feasible regardless of the political
system in place.
The paper relates to several branches of the literature. The set up allows to investigate the
dynamic feedback effects between the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions
and the process of economic development and inequality. Consequently, the model delivers
predictions for the development path of an economy together with its institutional and political
environment by uncovering the dynamic forces leading to institutional changes and, in turn,
the effects of these changes for economic development. The paper therefore contributes to the
increasing literature studying the economic forces behind the process of democratization. In their
seminal contributions, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2004) put forward the argument
that rich elites may initiate a democratic transition as a commitment device against regressive
redistribution to moderate the pressure of social conflict.3 In our model, as in other contributions
including Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Bertocchi and Spagat (2004), Lizzeri and Persico
(2004), and Llavador and Oxoby (2005), the process of endogenous institutional change is related
to an efficiency argument for the democratic transition which implies that the extension of the
franchise may also be in the own interest of (part of) the oligarchic elite.4 This feature is also
3In these papers, social conflict is seen as the main force leading to democratic transitions: oligarchic elites
facing substantial opposition and a threat of revolution release political power to larger parts of the population in
a controlled way. See also the discussion in Acemoglu, et al. (2004). Related studies that investigate extensions
of the franchise by the elite as an instrument to avoid conflict are Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) and Conley and
Temimi (2001).
4In these contributions, democratic regimes allow to increase efficiency by facilitating, or giving higher incen-
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present in the contribution by Gradstein (2006) who, as does our study, investigates the role
of inequality for the endogenous emergence of democracy. In fact, despite the different focus
on the endogenous emergence of public property rights protection, our results corroborate and
complement Gradstein’s findings on the role of initial inequality for the development path and
the transition to democracy.
Differently from most of the previous literature, in which democracy is a necessary and
sufficient condition to ensure the appropriability of economic efforts through a state of law, we
do not assume that democratic regimes are ‘intrinsically better’ than oligarchies, however. Both
political regimes can exhibit statically efficient economic institutions under a social contract,
or alternatively widespread wasteful conflict. The economic institutions are the equilibrium
outcome of a simple conflict game between two well defined social groups. The features of
societal conflict are shared with the contribution of Esteban and Ray (1999). While their aim is
to study how the extent of conflict, as measured by its wastefulness, depends on the preferences
and relative sizes of groups without considering the role of income inequality, the focus of our
paper is on disentangling the distinct roles of income inequality and political institutions in
determining conflict resolution and thus economic institutions, and in creating the conditions
under which a state of law can be sustained in equilibrium. Moreover, our paper also investigates
the resulting dynamic evolution of the economy. The emphasis on disentangling political and
economic institutions is shared by Acemoglu (2006), who concentrates on issues like inefficient
regulation of economic activities rather than democratization and the role of inequality, however.
Our model provides conditions under which different political regimes are expected to lead to
efficient outcomes, and delivers a rationale for the historical and contemporaneous empirical
observation that even oligarchies can be relatively efficient in preventing wasteful investment
in appropriative conflictual activities. In fact, our results are line with the empirical evidence
presented by Glaeser et al. (2004), that good economic and political institutions, although
causally affecting each other, can, but do not have to, go hand in hand. In the model, while
being equally effective in limiting conflict activities, the social contracts emerging in the different
regimes tend to be different, however. In particular, democracies are characterized in equilibrium
by larger governments, which provide more redistribution and public goods then oligarchies.
Therefore the different political regimes may be characterized by different patterns of dynamic
efficiency due to the different public policies, and the distortions and externalities associated
tives for, the accumulation of growth-enhancing human capital, by facilitating the provision of public goods as
compared to oligarchies, or by setting limits to rent-seeking and corruption by the elite and granting universal
property rights.
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with them. Whenever democracies emerge in equilibrium they are statically (and dynamically)
efficient in our model. This is not necessarily the case for oligarchies, which may be observed
in equilibrium even if they are inefficient. The joint predictions of the model can therefore
rationalize the empirical observation that in a long run perspective democracies seem to fare
better economically than oligarchies even though democratic institutions do not represent a
necessary condition for the emergence of good economic institutions.5 Also, rather than economic
development, inequality constitutes the main determinant of economic and political institutions
in our model. This allows to rationalize the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2005) that richer
countries in terms of higher per capita incomes are not necessarily more likely to be democratic.
The model can be applied to study the importance of natural resources and initial inequality
for the realization of uneven development paths. We show that the interplay of political and
economic institutions may explain episodes of reversal of fortunes. In particular, countries that
are richly endowed with natural resources, but where these resources are unequally distributed
among the population, can be overtaken in terms of income and growth by initially poorer but
more equal countries. Hence, natural resource abundance may negatively affect development
if it leads to poor economic institutions, which is more likely the larger the inequality in the
distribution of its ownership. This is in line with the historical discussion of development in
the Americas by Engerman and Sokoloff (2001). In this respect the paper also complements
the findings of Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006), who show that the quality of economic
institutions, i.e. the quality of the state of law and property rights enforcement, is crucial for the
occurrence of a resource course. A dynamic simulation is presented to illustrate the analytical
findings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework to analyze
consequences of the presence or absence of a social contract. The politico-economic equilibria
of the model are investigated in section 3. Section 4 studies the endogenous evolution of the
politico-economic environment of the economy over time and presents some simulations that
illustrate the properties and implications of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section introduces the institutional and economic environment under which the members of
a society live and make their decisions, and which they endogenously determine by their actions.
5See e.g. Barro (1999), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Papaioannou and Siourouni (2004), and Rodrik, Subra-
manian, and Trebbi (2004) for evidence that democracies are richer and grow faster than non-democracies.
4
We first discuss the conceptual properties of political and economic institutions that motivate
our model, and then their theoretical implementation.
2.1 Institutional Environment: A Social Contract View
The first component of the institutional environment is the political system. For simplicity, we
concentrate on two extreme political systems, oligarchy (or aristocracy) and democracy, both of
which differ by the formal allocation of political power. The difference between the two systems
is given by the degree of enfranchisement: in democracy, all members of society have the right to
vote, while in oligarchy some people are excluded and the constituency is restricted to a leading
class of oligarchs, the elite.6 This implies that the decisive agent for political decisions in the
two systems differs as well. Consequently, if the interests of the decisive agents in oligarchy and
democracy do not coincide, then different actual policies are implemented in the two systems.
The second component of the institutional environment are the rules governing all economic
and social interactions. In this respect, we discriminate between state of nature and state of law
established under a social contract, reflecting the views of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. A universally accepted social contract, or a state of law, is characterized by the
existence of universally known, accepted, and enforced rules that govern all social interactions.
Alternatively, the absence of a social contract is reflected the state of nature. The state of law is
more efficient than the state of nature, because individuals face no uncertainty concerning the
appropriability of their investments or permanent threat of being expropriated.
Following the views of Thomas Hobbes, under the state of nature...
“ every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all
other men. (...) For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application
of their strength, they [i.e. all men] do not help, but hinder one another, and reduce their
strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: (...) also, when there is no common enemy, they
make warre upon each other, for their particular interests.”
(T. Hobbes, 1651, Leviathan, Part 2 Ch. XVII, pp.128-129)
Our modelling of the politico-economic environment is in line with this view. Individuals
face an allocative problem on how to use their “strength” (i.e. income in our model), in the most
beneficial way. They decide whether or not to get involved in costly ’arming’, i.e. some sort of
6In our model, there is no need to distinguish between de jure and de facto political power, since both always
coincide, as will become clear below. The restriction to two regimes is made for simplicity. See e.g. Gradstein
(2006) for a model that allows for intermediate levels of enfranchisement.
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conflictual activities. We consider well defined social groups, elite and people. If both groups
engage in conflict, neither one will be successful: their attempts cancel each other leading to a
mere destruction of income, they “reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing”: this
is the source of inefficiency associated with the state of nature.7
Alternatively the different groups can adhere to a social contract and implement a state
of law by abstaining from getting involved in arming activities. According to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau the crucial attribute of a society is whether a state of law, exists, or whether the state
of nature rules:
“I therefore give the name “Republic” to every State that is governed by laws, no matter
what the form of its administration may be. (...) I understand by this word [Republic] not
merely an aristocracy or a democracy, but generally any government directed by the general
will, which is the law.”
(J.J. Rousseau, 1762, The Social Contract, Book 2 Ch. 6, pp.39-40)
In Rousseau’s view, a social contract can arise under very different political systems. In the
following we investigate the possibility of sustaining a social contract in the different political
regimes as well as the efficiency features of these equilibria.
2.2 The Model
We next present a model that operationalizes this institutional environment, in particular the
concepts of economic and political institutions, in a parsimonious way.
Individuals. Consider an economy, which is populated by an infinite sequence of overlapping
generations of individuals. A given generation consists of a continuum of adult individuals i,
representing generation t, and a continuum of young individuals i, who represent the adults
of generation t + 1. Each individual has a single parent and a single offspring, so the size
of the population, which is normalized to one, is constant across generations. We use i to
interchangeably denote an individual or the dynasty to which he belongs. The population is
divided in two groups. The first group constitutes the minority, making up for a fraction γ < 1/2
7The model can be extended by also considering within group conflict that has to do with the distributional
struggle arising if one group successfully expropriates the other, reflecting that individuals “make warre upon
each other, for their particular interests”. Such an extension, e.g. along the lines of Olson (1965) with internal
conflict being more easily resolved in smaller groups, would leave the qualitative results unaffected.
6
of the population. This group is called the elite, and denoted by E.8 The remaining fraction
(1 − γ) of the old population is called the people P . All members of a particular group are
identical, they face the same decision problems, and so we can interchangeably speak about a
(representative) member of the group or the entire group.
Agents derive utility only from consumption so that maximization of income is a necessary
and sufficient condition for utility maximization. Consumption is financed from the income
individuals derive from supplying factors of production to the market. During their youth indi-
viduals acquire human capital ht which is produced using only time.9 The human capital of a
generation Ht = ht, fully depreciates when the generation dies. While childhood is devoted to
the acquisition of human capital, income production and consumption take place during adult-
hood. Every individual is endowed with one unit of labor, which he inelastically supplies during
his adult life. Apart from labor and human capital, a fraction γ of individuals, the elite, are
endowed with natural resources like land. This land is equally distributed among the members
of the elite, each one owning nE = N/γ, and it is passed-on from generation to generation. The
landless people, i ∈ P , own no land, so nP = 0. Land, contrary to human capital, does not de-
preciate Nt = N . We denote per capita variables by lower case letters, and aggregate variables
by upper case letters, i.e. yt = Yt/L, ht = Ht/L, and n = N/L. Individuals derive incomes
from supplying their factor endowments and are given by yit = wt + rtht + ρtn
i, where wages
on labor and human capital, wt and rt, respectively, and the rent on land ρt are determined in
equilibrium. Since only members of the elite own land, individual incomes differ between the
two groups, with yEt > y
P
t .
Production. The economy is fully competitive, and all resources are employed in the
production of a single final commodity Y , which is used for consumption. The production
technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is of the form
Yt = [AtHt +N ]
α L(1−α) . (1)
Besides the inputs, production is affected by a productivity index At, which reflects the techno-
logical level of production and augments human capital.
8For later use we assume that members of this group possess some initial political power, enabling it to
constitute an oligarchic regime. For example, this power derives from the possession of particular resources, such
as land, or other peculiar attributes, like nobility. Alternatively, we could assume an income or wealth requirement
for political participation.
9In the following we consider the possibility that the acquired human capital may be affected by the provision
of a public good which for simplicity is modelled as an externality.
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The technological environment evolves endogenously depending on the total stock of human
capital available in the economy. Technological innovations in the form of changes in A arrive
with the birth of a new generation and build on the available stock of human capital. As a
result, we observe steady technological innovations which improve the production possibilities
of the economy,
At −At−1
At−1
= f (Ht−1) (2)
with f ′ (·) > 0.10 Following the endogenous growth literature along Lucas (1988) and Romer
(1990), human capital acquired by one generation exerts an externality on productivity of the
next generation, and is therefore the engine of growth, while technical progress is biased in favor
of augmenting the productivity of human capital.11 At the same time, these two features imply
that the available stock of human capital in a given generation indirectly makes human capital
a more important source of income for future generations.
Conflict Game. Conditional on the political system in place, the distribution of disposable
income is the result of a conflict game played between the different groups. Each group can
decide to either ”arm” or ”not arm”. The strategic form of the game is depicted in Figure
1. Whenever one group arms, a wasteful conflict arises. For simplicity we assume that such a
conflict implies that a share (1 − g) of total available income is lost, representing the cost of
conflict. If only one group chooses to arm and go to conflict, we observe a transfer of income
from the non armed to the armed group. Without loss of generality, we assume that all income
in the economy net of the waste implied by conflict is appropriated by the armed group. This
is illustrated in the off-diagonal panels of Figure 1. If both groups arm the result is mutual
opposition to nothing so that both groups burn a fraction (1− g) of their own income without
being able to appropriate anything in addition.12 This situation is depicted in the top-left panel
10Any formulation implying a positive relationship between human capital and technological progress is equiv-
alent for the results. This specification reflects the idea that the stock of ideas transfers into the productivity of
future generations, see e.g. Jones (2001).
11The specification of the production function, which is also used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2003), is formally
equivalent to the one with two distinct sectors, one exclusively employing land resources together with labor, and
the other exclusively human capital together with labor. Assuming that the productivity of land relative to human
capital decreases following technological change is consistent with historical evidence from England that suggests
that productivity growth in agriculture was modest if existent at all before and during the Industrial Revolution,
see Clark (2001, 2002).
12This game can be interpreted as an extreme form of a contest game with a non-convex conflict technology
in which a threshold expenditure (1− g) is needed to make the investment effective, and where the probability
of winning the contest is one if only one group arms and is zero if both groups arm. The assumption that the
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and essentially constitutes a society living under a state of nature with everybody struggling
against everybody while foregoing part of their income. Only if both groups abstain from arming,
conflict is avoided and no income is burned. If this is the case the society is characterized by a
social contract. A social contract may stipulate redistribution of income which, by not going to
conflict, is implicitly agreed across groups. The disposable income of available to the members
of the two groups under a social contract is denoted by y˜Pt and y˜
E
t , respectively. This case is
reflected in the lower right panel of the figure. The extent of taxation and income redistribution
across groups results from a political process that is studied next.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Political System and Income Redistribution. Under oligarchy, the political power is
in the hand of the elite who have the possibility to offer their preferred social contract (y˜Pt and
y˜Et ). The group in power cannot commit on any action, however. This implies that the elite
could e.g. announce a particular redistribution scheme and ex post implement a different one,
or announce that they will ‘not arm’, but eventually do arm in order to expropriate the people.
In terms of the game introduced before, this absence of commitment implies a timing in which
the elite always moves after the people. In turn, the defining characteristic of a democracy
is that that everybody participates in the process of political decision making. In the current
setting, the people represent the majority in the society so that the pivotal agent is a member
of the people under democracy. In terms of the extensive form of the game, this implies that in
oligarchy the elite moves last while the opposite is true in democracy. The political system is
therefore represented by the sequence of decisions and, in any regime, the group in power has
no possibility to commit over fiscal redistribution or arming behavior.
Fiscal redistribution, implemented under any social contract, mirrors the preferences of the
group which has political power. For convenience (and realism) we restrict the policy space in
both political systems such that there is a maximum extent of regressivity and progressivity.
To be more concrete, we assume that under any political system, the tax system can stipulate
at most either no redistribution from rich to poor or full redistribution and equalization of
incomes.13 We denote by Gt the total size of fiscal revenues and reflects the extent of the
redistribution scheme. Since the people are poorer than the elite, the equilibrium outcome
cost of conflict is the same if both groups or only one group arms do not affect the qualitative results because the
off-diagonals will turn out to be out of equilibrium events.
13This assumption is made for simplicity. In fact, to sustain equilibria we need much weaker restrictions on
the policy space. In particular, as long as policy space is restricted such that, under any political system, both
groups get at least a positive income net of taxes, the equilibria discussed in the next section are feasible.
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of a voting over taxation under democracy leads to maximum (progressive) redistribution.14
This means that the only feasible and credible tax and redistribution scheme under democracy
involves a social contract where all members of society receive the same income: y˜Et = y˜
P
t = yt.
Under oligarchy, on the other hand, the elite has no incentive to implement a social contract
involving progressive redistribution. Therefore, the social contract in an oligarchic republic
implies no redistribution y˜Et = y
E
t and y˜
P
t = y
P
t . This reflects the conventional view that the
social contract exhibits more progressive redistribution in democracies that in oligarchies, which
goes back to De Tocqueville (1835).15 This view is also in line with empirical and historical
evidence.16
Insert Figure 2(a) about here.
Insert Figure 2(b) about here.
Timing of Events. We first investigate the decisions of the members of the different groups
under the different systems. Depending on whether the economy is characterized by oligarchy
or democracy, the groups therefore play either the game depicted in Figure 2(a) or in Figure
2(b). The timing of events within a generation’s lifetime is as follows.
1. Birth and period of youth with human capital acquisition hit;
2. Adulthood, with
(a) production and income generation, wt, rt, ρt, yit;
14Notice that, as investigated below, taxation is distortionary in the sense that it may lead to a state of
nature by inducing arming. Under a state of law, taxation does not distort income production so that maximum
redistribution can induce full equalization of post-tax income.
15See also Meltzer and Richard (1981). Voting over linear-progressive tax schedules with distortions could be
introduced without changing the main results. This would lead to the ‘median voter hypothesis’, under which
taxation increases with inequality. A similar argument is made in the model by Bourguignon and Verdier (2000),
where the poor people cannot commit not to expropriate the rich elite once democracy is established. Also,
allowing for regressive redistribution in oligarchies would not change the result. What is crucial for our argument
is merely the higher progressivity of the redistribution scheme under the democratic social contract.
16In a historical discussion of economic and political development in Britain, Justman and Gradstein (1999)
argue that democratization was the prime factor that led to declining inequality in the aftermath of the Industrial
Revolution beginning in the second third of the 19th Century. In particular, the extension of the franchise led,
according to their discussion, to the replacement of regressive indirect taxes by progressive taxes on incomes, land
and inherited wealth following. Analyzing historical episodes and cross-country data, Gradstein and Milanovic
(2000) and Gradstein, Milanovic, and Ying (2001) find a robust positive correlation between democratization and
income equality.
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(b) realization of conflict decisions and equilibrium political regime;
(c) redistribution and realization of disposable incomes;
(d) consumption and death.
A new generation is born when its parent generation enters adulthood, and its grand-parent
generation dies. This completes the framework, whose dynamic properties are analyzed in the
following section.
3 Intra-generational Equilibria
In this section, we characterize the political environment that arises endogenously as equilib-
rium. A politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by a political system, a redistribution
scheme under this system, the arming behavior of the two groups, and the resulting factor and
consumable incomes of all members of society, such that all decisions constitute a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Factor Price Equilibrium and Individual Income
The economy is competitive and all factors are remunerated according to their marginal prod-
ucts.17 Equilibrium factor prices in terms of labor wages, wages for human capital and land
rents, in the economy are given by
wt = w(ht, At, n) = (1− α) [Atht + n]α ; (3)
rt = r(ht, At, n) = α [Atht + n]
α−1At ; (4)
and ρt = ρ(ht, At, n) = α [Atht + n]
α−1 , (5)
While the implied income share of labor is stable, the incomes generated by human capital grow
at the expense of the incomes generated by land over the course of development.18
For notational convenience, denote the effective stock of human capital available per member
of generation t in the economy as h˜t, with
h˜t ≡ Atht . (6)
17Evidence supports this assumption. Even historically, different sectors were competing for factors and factor
prices reflected productivities, even before or at early stages of the industrial revolution, see e.g. Magnac and
Postel-Vinay (1997).
18This is in line with historical evidence. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2003).
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Using this notation, and substituting with the expressions for equilibrium factor prices given by
conditions (3), (4) and (5), income of individual i, i ∈ {E,P}, can be expressed as
yit = wt + rtht + ρtn
i =
(
h˜t + n
)α [
(1− α) + αh˜t
h˜t + n
+
αni
h˜t + n
]
with i ∈ {E,P} . (7)
Average per capita income is given by yt =
(
h˜t + n
)α
. Also, denote individual income relative
to average per capita income by, λit ≡ y
i
t
yt
with i ∈ {E,P} where incomes of members of the elite
and the people differ because of the different land endowments. Denote the income of members
of the elite relative to that of people simply as λt ≡ y
E
t
yPt
.
3.2 The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
The goal of this section is to determine under which economic and political conditions a social
contract can be supported as equilibrium. By their own arming decisions, members of the dif-
ferent groups determine whether they live under a state of nature, or adopt a state of law. In
this sense, a social contract can only arise with mutual consent of all members of society, which
justifies the term.19 This section focuses on static equilibria, so we suppress generation indices
t as long as there is no possibility of confusion. The analysis of the dynamic evolution of the
economy and the endogenous emergence of different equilibria is postponed to the next section.
Three different types of equilibria can arise. These equilibria are denoted State of Nature, Oli-
garchic Republic, and Democratic Republic, and we characterize them in the following.
State of Nature. The state of nature is characterized by a situation in which all groups
invest in arming. This state arises in equilibrium if at least one group does not have sufficient
incentives to adhere to the social contract, and therefore deviates by investing in arming activ-
ities. Such an equilibrium can be the outcome of social interactions under any political regime.
Recall that, as stated above, we assume that no commitment over arming actions and policies
(redistribution) is possible by part of the group in power. This implies that in oligarchy the
elite moves last, after having observed the people’s arming decision. Likewise, in democracy the
people have the last move. Notice also that for the group that is not in power and therefore has
the first move, the best option is to arm in case it is anticipated that the group in power will
19Also here, the definition follows Rousseau’s description:
“ To find a form of association which defends and protects the person and property of each member with the
whole force of the community, and where each, while joining with all the rest, still obeys no one but himself,
and remains free as before.’ This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract provides the answer.”
(Rousseau, 1762, part 1 ch. 6, pp.14-15).
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arm. A direct implication of this observation is that a state of nature materializes in equilibrium
whenever the group in power, at the moment of making its move, has incentives to go to conflict
and arm. Recall that the absence of commitment over public policies implies that the social
contract in democracies (oligarchies) stipulates maximum (minimum) progressive redistribution.
Under oligarchy, if the elite arms and the people abstain from doing so, all income in the econ-
omy, net of the cost associated to arming and conflict, is appropriated by the ruling class. The
elite therefore has an incentive to arm ex-post if
yg
γ
> yE . (8)
Symmetrically, in a democratic regime a state of nature arises if the people have the incentive
to arm ex post. This is the case if the people earn a larger income by arming than by adhering
to the social contract which would allow them to obtain, at most, full equalization of incomes,
y
g
1− γ > y . (9)
But even if the people do not have an incentive to deviate from the social contract in democracies,
a sufficiently rich elite can find it optimal to arm. This is the case if the cost of redistribution
is sufficiently large for the elite to prefer to pay the cost of arming.20
yEg > y . (10)
The economic outcome under state of nature, i.e. in the absence of economic institutions under
which individuals optimally abstain from arming and without a social contract, is the same
regardless of the political system. Hence we have the following,
Proposition 1 (State of Nature). The politico-economic equilibrium state of nature is char-
acterized by societal conflict with all individuals investing in arms, and Gt = 0. For any
{At,N,Ht, γ}, the state of nature equilibrium emerges if, and only if, condition (8) holds under
oligarchy, while under democracy a state of nature arises if either (9) or (10) holds.
Proof. Consider the conflict game under oligarchy as depicted in Figure 2(a) in which (8) holds.
In this case Gt = 0 and no income is taxed. Not to arm is a strictly dominated strategy for
the elite. Anticipating this, also the people arm, excluding the possibility for a social contract,
proving the first claim. Likewise, consider the conflict game under democracy as depicted in
Figure 2(b) in which (9) holds. Anticipating that no arming is a strictly dominated strategy
20Notice that in this case arming can be also interpreted as an investment in private property rights protection
since it also serves the role of not be subject to fiscal redistribution.
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for the people, the elite will arm regardless of any income condition. If (9) is violated, the
elite induces a social contract by choosing not to arm, or a state of nature by choosing to arm.
However, if (10) holds, again not to arm is strictly dominated, leading the elite to induce a state
of nature equilibrium.
The emergence of a state of nature depends on the level of inequality prevalent in the economy
at each moment in time as well as on the degree of inefficiency associated to arming. Deviations
from the social contract are less likely if arming is substantially distorting. In fact, for any degree
of economic inequality it is possible to identify an upper bound on the wastefulness of conflict
above which the social contract can always be implemented, i.e. the state of nature cannot arise
in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For any {At,N,Ht, γ} there always exists a level g (γ) ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
g < g (γ)
the state of nature cannot emerge in equilibrium.
Proof. In the appendix.
A social contract can only emerge if it represents a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium of
the game depicted in Figure 2(a) for the case of oligarchy and in Figure 2(b) for the case of
democracy. In order to investigate conditions under which a social contract can emerge in
equilibrium in a non-trivial way, for the moment we restrict attention to the case in which a
state of nature can actually arise in equilibrium, i.e. g > g (γ).21
Oligarchic Republic. In an oligarchy, political power is restricted to the members of the
elite who cannot commit ex ante to their actions. Nevertheless, in equilibrium it is possible to
sustain a social contract if the elite find it optimal not to arm ex-post, provided that the people
also refrain from arming. Analogously to condition (8) this is the case if and only if,
yg/γ < yE . (11)
If this condition holds, oligarchic republic is the elite’s strictly preferred regime. Since the people
move first under an oligarchic system, they anticipate that if they would arm, they would induce
the elite to do the same, leading to a state of nature. Notice also that if condition g > g (γ) holds,
then condition (10) is satisfied and the elite arms under a democracy with full redistribution. In
21In the other parametric configuration the equilibrium is always characterized by a social contract. For
expositional convenience we discuss this case in the appendix.
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this case, the implementation of a democratic system inevitably leads to a state of nature. But
since the income under state of nature is lower for the people than under an oligarchic republic
in which there is no arming in equilibrium, oligarchic republic is the strictly preferred choice for
the people, too. Hence, under condition (11) a social contract can be sustained in equilibrium.
Under these conditions all individuals strictly prefer an oligarchy to a democracy, i.e. all groups
agree that leave the power in the hands of the elite is best option. This equilibrium reflects
Hobbes’ idea of a Leviathan.22
Proposition 2 (Oligarchic Republic). For any {At,N,Ht, γ} and g > g (γ), the politico-
economic equilibrium is an oligarchic republic, characterized by political franchise which is re-
stricted to the elite, Gt = 0, and no arming, if and only if condition (11) holds.
Proof. Consider the conflict game under oligarchy as depicted in Figure 2(a) under which con-
dition (11) holds. Then the elite strictly prefer not to arm in case the people choose not to arm,
but arm if also the people deviate and arm. In this case, however, arming is a strictly dominated
strategy for the people, since g < 1, and no group rent-seeks in equilibrium. On the other hand,
if condition (11) is violated, not to arm is strictly dominated for the elite, inducing both groups
to arm in equilibrium.
Condition (11) is more likely to be satisfied, ceteris paribus, the richer the elite is compared
to the people, and the more wasteful is the conflict. Rearranging, one obtains λE > g/γ. The
larger the income of the rich group relative to the average, and the larger the cost of conflict
(i.e. the smaller g), the more easily this condition is satisfied as the elite has less to gain from
arming.23 This condition requires that, under democracy, arming on the side of the elite is
still more attractive than full redistribution. Rewritten as λE > g/γ it becomes clear that for
the equilibrium to arise, conflict must not be overly wasteful and inequality must not be too low.
Democratic Republic. We next show under which conditions a social contract in which
22Hobbes’ idea of a Leviathan implies that everybody would gain by giving all power in the hands of a small
elite, or one person: “The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them (...) from
the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as by their owne industrie, and by the fruites
of the Earth they may nourish themselves, and live contendedly; is to conferre all their power and strength upon
one Man, or upon one Assembly of men (...) and therein to submit their Wills, everyone to his Will and their
Judgements to his Judgement.” (T. Hobbes, 1651, Leviathan, Part 2 Ch. XVII, p. 131).
23Similar to our idea that a social contract can emerge only if it is credible, in the paper by Grossman (2004)
constitutions provide an alternative to social conflict only if they are self-enforcing, that is, if no party has a big
advantage in a social conflict.
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no group gets involved in arming can be sustained under a democratic regime. This democratic
republic equilibrium is feasible only if the people are credible in sticking with the social contract,
without arming and expropriating the elite. Hence, for a democratic republic to be feasible it
must hold that the people have incentives not to arm, i.e. that, symmetrically to condition (9),
we must have,
y
g
(1− γ) < y . (12)
On the other hand, for this equilibrium to emerge, the elite must obey to the system, and not,
by arming in order to protect their incomes, break the social contract,
yEg < y . (13)
While being less attractive than an oligarchic republic, from the elite’s point of view a democratic
system can nevertheless be the best available option. This is the case whenever a social contract
can only be implemented under a democracy which in turn is strictly preferred to a state of
nature. If g > g (γ) then condition (8) holds implying that a democracy is the preferred regime
by all groups in society and consequently emerges as politico-economic equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Democratic Republic). For any {At,N,Ht, γ} and g > g (γ), the politico-
economic equilibrium is a democratic republic, characterized by universal franchise, progressive
redistribution with Gt = yt, and no arming if, and only if, conditions (12) and (13) hold.
Proof. Consider the conflict game under oligarchy as depicted in Figure 2(b) under which con-
ditions (12) and (13) hold. Condition (12) implies that the people optimally arm if the elite
arm, and forbear from arming if the elite choose not to arm. The latter is only a viable strategy
for the elite if (13) is satisfied, otherwise the elite induce a state of nature. On the other hand,
if (12) does not hold, arming is a strictly dominant strategy for the people, and therefore also
for the elite anticipating the people’s decision.
Under these conditions, the elite prefers a democracy with full redistribution to a wasteful
state of nature. Rearranging (13) yields λE < 1/g, implying that inequality must be sufficiently
low to make the opportunity cost of redistribution bearable for the elite such that members of
this group actually prefer democracy to a deviation to arming. Alternatively, the condition holds
if the inefficiency associated with the state of nature is sufficiently large. The people have no
incentive to deviate and arm once observing the elite’s decision only if (12) holds. Rearranging,
one obtains g < (1−γ) ≡ g (γ), which implies that for a democratic republic to arise, the cost of
arming must be sufficiently large as to induce the people not to deviate and arm. Therefore we
16
can establish a lower bound on the wastefulness of conflict which is necessary to make a social
contract emerge in a democracy in the absence of the possibility for the people to commit on
policies and actions.
Lemma 2. For any {At,N,Ht, γ} and any degree of income inequality λt there always exists a
level g (γ) ≡ (1− γ) such that for any g > g (γ) a democracy cannot emerge in equilibrium.
Proof. The claim follows from rearranging (12) and Proposition 3.
During the life of each generation t the economy is characterized by a unique level of inequal-
ity λt. By inspection of the conditions for emergence of the different equilibria in Propositions
1, 2 and 3, we have that only one equilibrium can emerge for any given λt.
Proposition 4 (Taxonomy of Politico-Economic Equilibria). For any {At,N,Ht, γ} and
given g ∈ [g (γ) , g (γ)] , all three types of politico-economic equilibria can arise. For any gen-
eration t the politico-economic equilibrium is uniquely determined by the level of inequality λt.
There exist two thresholds of income inequality λSN > λD such that:
(i) For λEt > λSN the equilibrium is Oligarchic Republic;
(ii) For λEt ∈ (λD, λSN ) the equilibrium is State of Nature;
(iii) For λEt < λD the equilibrium is Democratic Republic.
Proof. Existence of all three types of equilibria follows from condition g ∈ [g(γ), g(γ)] and
Lemmata 1 and 2. Inspection of the conditions for emergence of the different equilibria in
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 makes clear that only one equilibrium can emerge for any given λt.
There exists a unique level of income inequality, denoted by λSN = g/γ such that condition (8)
holds with equality. From Proposition 2, this implies that an Oligarchic Republic can emerge as
equilibrium only if λEt > λSN . Similarly there a unique λD = 1/g such that condition (10) holds
with equality so that by Proposition 3 a democratic republic can be implemented in equilibrium
only if λEt < λD. Notice that if g > g(γ) then λSN > λD. In this case if λ
E
t > λSN a social
contract emerges under oligarchy while if λEt < λD a social contract emerges under democracy.
Finally if λEt ∈ (λD, λSN ) then the equilibrium is a state of nature.
The economy can be characterized by three different politico-economic equilibria. All three
equilibria can be observed if, on the one hand, the cost of conflict in terms of wasted resources
is not too small since otherwise arming would be too attractive, and democracy would not
emerge; and if, on the other hand, the cost of conflict is not too large, implying that the state
of nature would be prohibitively distortive and therefore never be observed. The proposition
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also implies that the politico-economic equilibrium is unique no matter which group chooses the
political system as long as g ∈ [g (γ) , g (γ)]. In fact, among all members of society, regardless
to which group they belong, there is unanimity about the political system as long as it serves
to implement a social contract. A social contract is feasible under oligarchy for sufficiently
high levels of inequality since the condition under which the elite does not arm under oligarchy,
condition (8), is satisfied for higher levels of inequality than the condition under which the elite
prefers democracy, condition (13).
Before proceeding, consider the intuition behind the condition g ∈ [g (γ) , g (γ)]. In fact,
only one part of the condition can be violated at a time. As indicated by Lemmata 1 and 2, the
main implication of a violation is that one type of equilibrium becomes infeasible. If g > g (γ),
the people have an incentive to deviate from a social contract under democracy, as becomes
clear when recalling condition (12). This renders a democratic republic infeasible so that the
equilibrium is either an oligarchy or a state of nature. If g < g (γ), the state of nature is so
inefficient to always induce both groups to subscribe a social contract. Hence, the emergence
of the different regimes is crucially related the level of inequality, as is studied in more detail
below. In particular, for intermediate levels of inequality a social contract may be feasible under
both oligarchy and democracy.24
To summarize, the model so far provides conditions under which a society can implement
Rousseau’s idea of a social contract under the rule of law. As has been shown, this is possible
both under oligarchy, reflecting Hobbes’ view of a potentially beneficial Leviathan, as well as
under a democratic system. Failure to reach universal obeyance to a social contract under either
political system, however, inevitably leads to a state of nature. This implies that static efficiency,
in the sense of avoiding wasteful conflict, is not confined to a particular political system, that is,
democracy is not necessarily inherently ‘better’ in this respect. The major difference between
oligarchy and democracy is the extent of public intervention in the market economy, however.
While fiscal revenues are zero under oligarchy, there is taxation and redistribution under democ-
racy. If there exists some externality from a larger public sector then these two regimes may be
characterized by different dynamic efficiency features, however, as studied below.
24In particular, under certain conditions multiple equilibria can arise, in the sense that society is characterized
by a conflict of interest concerning the political system. In this case, each group strictly prefers the equilibrium
which grants them larger political power. As is discussed in the appendix, all qualitative results are unaffected.
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4 Dynamic Evolution of the Economy
We now turn to the dynamic analysis of the model and to discuss the conditions under which
the political equilibria derived in section 3 arise endogenously.
4.1 Development and Politico-Economic Institutions
We first study the evolution of the key state variables, effective human capital h˜t, and relative
inequality λt = λEt /λ
P
t = y
E
t /y
P
t . The key parameters are the initial inequality in terms of land
resources expressed by γ, the inefficiency of the state of nature, g, the process of technological
progress, and the total size of the land resources of the economy, n.
Human capital is acquired by all generations throughout history. Because of the externality
of human capital on technology, the effective stock of knowledge reflected in productivityA grows
monotonically and unboundedly over the course of generations. This observation is recorded in
Lemma 3. Productivity A is increasing monotonically overtime and grows unboundedly with
limt→∞At =∞.
Proof. In the appendix.
As a result of this human capital-driven technological progress land becomes less and less
important in the production process and its role as a source of individual income declines. In the
limit, human capital is the only relevant factor of production. Since the unequal distribution of
natural resources is the only source of inequality in incomes, this observation implies that income
inequality between the groups tends to decrease monotonically over the course of generations
and vanishes in the limit.25
Lemma 4. Once the economy is sufficiently developed in terms of productivity, income inequality
decreases monotonically over the course of generations, and vanishes in the limit, limt→∞ λEt =
limt→∞ λt = 1.
Proof. In the appendix.
We are now in a position to study the development path of the economy, and the role of
inequality for the process of politico-economic development. The qualitative features of the
following results go through as long as natural resources lose importance and eventually human
capital is the main factor of income production, implying that in the limit inequality in factor
25Notice that this asymptotic result concerning the relative incomes of landed elite and landless people does
not hinge on the assumption of two groups.
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endowment loses importance. The monotonic decline in inequality is not necessary for the main
results but facilitates the illustration.26 For the sake of illustration and without loss of generality,
assume that initial conditions imply a high level of inequality λE0 such that the conditions for
oligarchic republic are met.27 As becomes clear from the structure of individual incomes as
displayed in equation (7), already in the initial period the elite has higher income than the
people, simply by the fact that they own the same labor and human capital endowments, but,
in addition, land, that is λP1 ≤ 1 ≤ λE1 . Note that this is true regardless of which political
environment individuals face.
Since oligarchic republic equilibria only vanish with sufficiently low inequality, and since
inequality is monotonously decreasing in the level of development, which is reflected in produc-
tivity A, it follows from Lemma 4 that there exists a unique level of development A for which
the economy enters the sequence of state of nature equilibria: A : g/γ = λEt(A). From Lemma
3 we know that there exists a one-to-one relationship between the level of technology and time
in terms of generations t. Hence, denote the generation for which the conditions for oligarchic
republic and state of nature bind with equality as t = t(A). Likewise, once the economy is
sufficiently developed, state of nature equilibria disappear, giving rise to democratic republic
equilibria. Again, Lemma 4 allows us to denote this level of development by A¯ : λE
t(A¯)
= 1/g,
and Lemma 3 allows us to translate this into a point in time for which the economy is at the
verge of state of nature turning into a democratic republic, t¯ = t(A¯).
Given this, we can prove the following
Proposition 5 (Development Path). For any {A0,N, γ} such that condition (8) holds, and
given g ∈ [g (γ) , g (γ)] the dynamic path of the economy is characterized by t < t implying a
sequence of oligarchic republic equilibria during early stages of development, followed by state of
nature for intermediate levels of development, and eventually a sequence of democratic republic
equilibria.
Proof. Existence of all three types of equilibria follows from Proposition 4. If inequality is
sufficiently high in the early stages of development, λEt > g/γ = λSN , and the politico-economic
equilibrium is Oligarchic Republic from Proposition 2. From Lemmata 3 and 4 we have that
λE declines monotonically and converges to 1. Hence, eventually the only equilibrium becomes
26Accounting for features like differential fertility, credit market imperfections affecting educational outcomes,
or heterogeneity in the accumulation of human capital could lead to a non-monotonic change in inequality with
intermediate periods of increasing inequality before eventually declining, see e.g. Bertocchi and Spagat (2004) and
Galor (2005).
27In the current context, this is equivalent to assuming a sufficiently low initial level of productivity, A0.
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a State of Nature once λSN > λEt > λD, compare Proposition 1. As development continues,
λE decreases further. Once λEt < 1/g = λD the unique politico-economic equilibrium is a
Democratic Republic, see Proposition 3, because limt→∞ λEt = 1 < 1/g.
The condition for which the elite prefers democracy to conflict, condition (13), binds at
lower levels of inequality, and thus for later generations, than the condition under which the
elite cannot sustain an oligarchic republic by credibly announcing not to arm, condition (11).
This implies that a democratic republic eventually emerges in equilibrium.
Finally, consider the cases when g ∈ [g(γ), g(γ)] does not hold. Due to Lemma 2, no democ-
racy can be observed if g > g (γ). In this case, and without the possibility to commit on public
policies, the economy is initially characterized by oligarchic republic equilibria, and eventually
ends up in a state of nature.28 If, on the other hand, g < g(γ) then t > t, which implies a
direct transition from an oligarchy to a democracy along the development path, without a state
of nature ever emerging along the development path.
4.2 Inequality, Natural Resource Abundance and Development
Having characterized the overall pattern of development in the economic and political domain, we
now turn to the investigation of the properties of the development path in detail. First note that,
without loss of generality, we restrict attention to the case in which all three politico-economic
equilibria can arise. Recall that t and t denote the generations for which an oligarchy becomes
unsustainable and a democracy becomes sustainable, respectively. We have the following result,
Proposition 6 (Natural Resource Abundance and Institutional Development). For
any {A0} and any g ∈
[
g (γ) , g (γ)
]
, a larger natural resource abundance (i.e. a larger N given
γ) implies:
(i) a later transition from oligarchic republic to state of nature (i.e. a larger t);
(ii) a later transition from state of nature to democracy (i.e. a larger t¯).
Proof. In the appendix.
This proposition illustrates the crucial role of natural resource abundance in determining the
endogenous emergence of politico-economic equilibria. Both types of transition, from oligarchy
to state of nature, and from this state of nature to democracy occur later the larger N . The
main intuition for the result is that the larger the rents accruing to the elite from the control
over natural resources the larger is income inequality over the course of development. This has
28This claim is made formally and proven in the appendix.
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two important implications for the dynamic evolution of the economy. In the first place the
elite can sustain a social contract longer inside an oligarchy since they face a lower incentive to
arm and expropriate the disenfranchised people. On the other hand they face a larger (shadow)
cost of redistribution which delays the transition to a democracy. With respect to the level of
inequality in resource endowments, we have the following result.
Proposition 7 (Inequality and Institutional Development). For any {A0} and any g
∈ [g (γ) , g (γ)], a larger inequality in the ownership of natural resources (i.e. a smaller γ given
N) implies:
(i) an earlier transition from oligarchic republic to state of nature (i.e. a smaller t);
(ii) a later transition from state of nature to democracy (i.e. a larger t¯).
Proof. In the appendix.
Concerning the effect of inequality on the timing of the transition to a state of nature two
effects are at work, implying that the larger inequality in resource endowments, i.e. the smaller
γ, the larger the possible range for state of nature equilibria. Larger inequality increases the per
capita income of each member of the elite, which makes them more credible in not arming. But
at the same the expected returns on arming are higher by decreasing the size of the group that
has to share the appropriated incomes. Since the second effect always dominates the first, larger
inequality (i.e. smaller γ) implies an earlier transition into state of nature. Larger inequality,
on the other hand, implies a larger (shadow) cost of redistribution, delaying the transition to
democracy. As illustrated in the simulation below even a relative small difference in natural
resources abundance and inequality may have important implications for the development of
the economy leading to episodes of growth miracles, overtaking and divergence.
4.3 Political Regimes and Development
The results so far give a characterization of the politico-economic equilibria that can arise along
the development path of the economy. From the analysis in the previous section, we also know
that both oligarchy and democracy can be effective in avoiding wasteful conflict. The possibility
to finance a public good like an education system out of the budget for redistribution, however,
allows for an externality that implies a higher growth potential under a democratic republic
equilibrium as we now discuss. In the context of the model, the amount of fiscal revenues col-
lected with taxation and used for redistribution, which is denoted by Gt, can alternatively be
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interpreted as a publicly provided good (rather than a monetary payment).29 If this in-kind
redistribution is not confined to consumptive payments, but has an externality on the human
capital formation, like the provision of a public education system, this provides scope for differ-
ences in the dynamic efficiency between the different political regimes. In fact, whenever public
good provision positively affects the level of human capital, ht = h(Gt−1), democracy is dynami-
cally more efficient than oligarchy. This dynamic externality is consistent with empirical findings
that democracies foster growth through improved conditions for human capital accumulation,
see e.g. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg (2001).30
Proposition 8. If ht = h(Gt−1) with ∂h/∂Gt−1 > 0, then a transition to a democratic republic
implies an acceleration in the development of the economy compared any other politico-economic
equilibrium.
Proof. The claim immediately follows from the formulation of improvements in productivity in
(2), since At = f(Ht−1 (Gt−2)). Because of the time structure, the acceleration of technological
progress begins in the generation of grand children of the generation experiencing the democratic
transition since Gt = 0 for every t in an oligarchic republic or state of nature equilibrium.
This result implies that democracies may provide a better environment for growth than
oligarchies, even in the case in which the latter are statically efficient in the sense that a social
contract can be implemented. Hence, the sooner a country democratizes the faster it develops.
Finally notice that these results are obtained by neglecting any dynamic inefficiencies of
social unrest under the state of nature. It is easy to imagine that societal conflict and widespread
arming has long-run effects apart from the static inefficiency because of the resources wasted
in conflict. Examples would be negative effects on investment and the accumulation of factors
such as physical or human capital. In this case, each period in which resources are wasted in
conflict inflicts a permanent effect on the development path of the economy. If the model were
extended in this direction, the implication would not only be that earlier democratic transitions
are beneficial. As additional prediction, countries would then develop faster the shorter the
period of state of nature and social unrest.
29Note that formally, since population size is normalized to 1, there is no distinction between a publicly provided
private good and a pure public good.
30In principle one could consider the choices of public good provision and redistribution jointly and explicitly,
see. e.g. Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde (2006). For the purpose of this paper we only want to highlight that
in democracy there is larger room for public policies since the poor face a lower marginal cost of taxation, which
leads to larger governments. Therefore oligarchies and democracies cannot be expected to be equally efficient in
general even in the case in which a social contract can be implemented.
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4.4 Illustrative Simulation
We end by presenting simulations of the model to illustrate the main mechanism and the main
implications. Without loss of generality, in the simulations we restrict attention to the case
in which all three politico-economic equilibria can arise, i.e. when g ∈ [g (γ) , g (γ)]. In order
to be able to simulate the model, we need to make assumptions about the specification of the
functions that were left unspecified so far. In particular, following Jones (2001), we specify the
function of technological progress (2) as
At = At−1
[
1 + βHδt−1
]
,
with β > 0 and 0 < δ < 1. The externality of the size of the redistributive state on human
capital formation in the form of public schooling is specified as
Ht = (1 + φGt−1)ρ ,
with φ > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1.
To show theoretical predictions described in the previous section and to highlight the role of
natural resources abundance and inequality in reproducing episodes overtaking, we proceed in
steps. Consider first an economy characterized by a relatively low level of initial inequality in
land ownership, and a relatively large elite. In particular, let us assume that the total amount
of land available in the economy is N = 20 and that the group of landlords represents 32% of
the population (i.e. γ = 0.32). The full parametrization used for the simulation is displayed in
Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of income in this economy and compares the actually realized
disposable income generation by generation with the potential disposable income that could be
realized if an efficient state of law were implemented. As shown in the figure, this economy is
characterized by an oligarchy which is able to implement an efficient state of law during the
early generations. This is possible since inequality is sufficiently high during the early stages of
development in order to make expropriation not attractive for the elite. The elite is therefore
credible in offering and respecting the rule of law. As generations pass and income inequality
shrinks, the arming on the landless people becomes more and more attractive for the ruling
elite. This eventually leads to a situation in which the social contract cannot be sustained
under an oligarchic regime. The economy therefore enters a phase in which the state of nature
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characterizes the interactions between the two social groups. Realized disposable income drops
substantially below potential income because of the waste associated with conflict. Finally,
after a substantial number of generations has lived in this dismal state, the society eventually
returns to efficiency by making a democratic transition. The reason for this transition is that
the progressive reduction of inequality makes democracy the most attractive solution also for the
elite: they are willing to trade-off redistribution against the efficiency gains associated with the
state of law. Note that this transition towards a democratic system coincides with the decisive
take off of the economy towards a path of more rapid and sustained growth. To sum up, the
simulation illustrates the path of development from an oligarchic republic with a social contract
despite limited political franchise reflecting Hobbes’ idea of a Leviathan, to a Hobbesian state of
nature, in which society engages in universal conflict, and eventually to a social contract in the
sense of Rousseau, with effective and equal protection of property rights and universal franchise.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Now, consider how the development process is affected by different distributions of natural
resources. Compare two economies that are identical to the one studied before, but that differ in
γ. In particular, let us compare Economy 1 (with γ1 = 0.35) to a more unequal Economy 2 (with
γ2 = 0.28). Proposition 6 (i) predicts that Economy 1 enters state of nature later and transits
to democratic republic earlier than Economy 2. This is shown in Figure 4. Economy 1 in fact
experiences a later transition into the inefficient state of nature, and a much shorter duration
of this dismal state than Economy 2. Hence, the distribution of natural resources affects the
timing of the transitions between the different politico-economic equilibria. However, since the
transition to the democratic republic equilibrium happens earlier in the economy with the more
equal distribution of natural resources, also the growth-enhancing effects of democratization
kicks in earlier, leading to a divergence of incomes at later stages of development.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Natural resource abundance coupled with inequality may generate patterns of overtaking
and divergence across countries. This possibility is explored in more detail by comparing two
economies that differ both in the distribution as well as the level of natural resources. Again,
consider two economies that are identical in all parameters and initial conditions, but where
economy 1 is poorer in natural resources with N1 = 17 while N2 = 23, and where these natural
resources are additionally more equally distributed in economy 1 (as before with γ1 = 0.35
while γ2 = 0.28). The consequences of differences in both natural resource abundance and
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distribution for the development paths of the economies are illustrated in Figure 5. Economy
2 initially exhibits higher incomes, because it is richer in terms of natural resources. Due to
the higher initial inequality, economy 2 enters the state of nature earlier than economy 1, and
remains trapped in the state of nature equilibrium for a larger number of generations. The earlier
democratization of economy 1, however, leads to an earlier take-off in growth in that economy.
The figure illustrates that, even when entering democracy eventually, economy 2 cannot make
up this lost ground, and the two economies diverge. Hence, as generations pass, the initially
poorer but more equal society catches up and eventually overtakes the richer one. The reason
is that the initially poorer and more equal economy is sooner prepared to reap the benefits
of a democratic transition. These dynamics of the model are also in line with the historical
discussion by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2004), who provide extensive evidence on the role
played by natural resource abundance and institutional development in the process of economic
development of the Americas. Focussing on the divergent development patterns of the Americas,
they show how the originally richer and more unequal Central and South American countries
were unable to implement an efficient institutional system. This eventually led to the overtaking
by North American countries, which were able to implement efficient institutions and reaped
their benefits.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
The previous simulation also points out that even small differences in natural resource abun-
dance and in their distribution may have important dynamic implications for the development
possibilities of a country.31
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a theory in which economic and political institutions are interdependent and
emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Good economic institutions in the form of a Rousseauvian
social contract can arise in equilibrium if and only if no group in society has an incentive to
deviate and invest in appropriation activities and conflict. Economic institutions are distinct
31Notice that since we rule out static distortions from inequality on human capital accumulation due to credit
market imperfections as discussed in e.g. Banerjee and Newman (1991) or Galor and Zeira (1993), the total
production under the oligarchic republic is the same in both economies. Thus, the distribution of natural resources
has no effect on the static production possibilities of the economy. The consideration of distortions in the formation
of aggregate human capital would reinforce the importance of inequality and natural resource abundance for
development.
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from political institutions that govern aggregation of preferences regarding redistribution. The
politico-economic equilibrium is crucially affected by the level of development and, in particular,
economic inequality. At the same time, the political and economic institutions causally determine
economic development and inequality. A social contract may be sustained only under the rule
of an oligarchic elite when development is low and inequality is very large. This is the case in
economies in which the control over factors of production, particularly natural resources, is very
unequal. The redistributive pressure that arises from the reallocation of political political power
to parts of the population with smaller endowments associated with a democratic transition
would, under these conditions, push the newly enfranchised toward excessive fiscal redistribution.
The reaction of the rich who try to protect their wealth would lead to a conflictual state of nature
equilibrium. On the other hand, a transition to democracy represents the only possibility to
sustain a social contract if the control over natural resources is sufficiently equal and inequality
is sufficiently small. Under these conditions, the elite cannot credibly refrain from expropriating
the other members of society under oligarchy, but at the same time the costs arising from
redistribution under democracy are lower for the elite than the costs that would arise from
society-wide conflict.
The results imply that a focus on political structures and democratization is neither necessary
nor sufficient for making a social contract feasible. Conflictual equilibria may materialize under
both regimes as long as there are incentives for some parts of the population to expropriate
other groups. In terms of development, the model also predicts that, due to the different public
policies implemented in the different regimes, democracies are likely to be dynamically more
efficient than oligarchies. These results are in line with empirical findings that democracies
are on average richer than oligarchies and that democratic transitions are usually beneficial in
terms of efficiency (and even more so in terms of equity), even though democratic institutions
do not seem to represent a necessary or sufficient condition for good economic institutions such
as a state of law. We show that, in the presence of dynamic externalities, the emergence of
the different political regimes, and accordingly the implementation of different public policies,
may lead to different patterns of development. In particular the model provides a rationale
why naturally rich countries with high inequality often display worse economic records than
countries with little natural resources. By providing a simple dynamic simulation we illustrate
the analytical results and show that episodes of reversal of fortunes can be the consequence of
the endogenous emergence of inferior economic institutions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs and Supplementary Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. A necessary condition for the emergence of a state of nature is that the elite cannot
refrain from arming under oligarchy. In this case the state of nature arises if a social contract
under democracy is not feasible that is if either the elite or the people have incentives to arm
under democracy. This is the case when (8) holds together with (9) or (10). Conditions (8) and
(10) hold simultaneously if
yg/γ > yE ∧ gyE > y ⇔ g/γ > λE > 1/g
which implies g/γ > 1/g ⇔ 1/γ > 1/g2 .
Hence, (8) and (10) cannot be jointly satisfied if g <
√
γ. In this case a state of nature can arise
only if the people deviate in democracy, that is, if (9) is not satisfied. This is the case only if
g > 1− γ. But note that (9) is redundant whenever g < √γ if √γ < 1− γ. On the other hand,
(9) is not redundant if
√
γ > 1 − γ. A state of nature can therefore arise only if g > (1− γ).
Hence for any {At,N,Ht, γ} we can identify g (γ) = min
{√
γ, 1− γ} such that for any g < g (γ)
the state of nature cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof. The result follows from (2) and ht > 0 ∀t, implying that (At −At−1) /At−1 > 0 ∀t.
Rearranging condition (2), technological progress is of the form At = (1 + f(Ht−1))At−1 =
dt−1(Ht−1)At−1 with dt−1(·) > 1 ∀t > 1 due to the human capital accumulation process. For any
A0 > 0, we can rewriteAt =
(∏t
j=1 dj−1
)
A0, where
(∏t
j=1 dj−1
)
> 1 and limt−→∞
(∏t
j=1 dj−1
)
=
∞. This means that the process is autoregressive, positive monotonous and non stationary.
Hence, At is strictly increasing generation after generation, with limt−→∞At =∞.
In the following , we characterize the equilibria for the parametric cases complementary to
the one of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (Taxonomy of Politico-Economic Equilibria - Alternative Cases). For
any {At,N,Ht, γ},
(i) a democratic republic cannot emerge if g > g (γ). In this case the politico-economic
equilibrium is an Oligarchic Republic if λEt > λSN or a State of Nature if λ
E
t < λSN ;
(ii) a state of nature cannot emerge if g < g (γ), since then λD > λSN . The politico-
economic equilibrium in this case is an Oligarchic Republic if λEt > λD, a Democratic Republic
if λEt < λSN and a social contract can be sustained either in an oligarchy or in a democracy if
λSN < λ
E
t < λD.
Proof. (i) Under oligarchy, for any λEt > λSN the elite prefers not to arm as implied by Propo-
sition 2. The people agree with an oligarchic republic and do not deviate to arm because of the
associated costs, supporting the oligarchic republic equilibrium. Alternatively, when λE < λSN ,
the elite is not credible in refraining from arming, triggering arming by the people as best reply.
Hence, in this case a state of nature arises under oligarchy. Moreover, from Lemma 2, no demo-
cratic republic can arise in equilibrium, so the only equilibrium in this case is state of nature.
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(ii) If g < g (γ) then from Lemma 1 the state of nature never arises in equilibrium. From
conditions (8) and (10), g < g (γ) implies that λD = 1/g > λSN = g/γ. In this case for any
λEt > λD > λSN , the elite chooses to arm under democracy but not under oligarchy. Again, the
people do not deviate to arming and hence the equilibrium is an oligarchic republic. For any
λD > λSN > λ
E
t the elite arm under oligarchy but not under democracy. Since the people do
not deviate either under these conditions, the equilibrium is a democratic republic. Finally, for
λSN < λ
E
t < λD both elite and people prefer not to arm under either regime so that a social
contract is feasible in both an oligarchy and a democracy. Notice however that in this case the
elite would prefer an Oligarchic Republic to a Democratic Republic due to the different redis-
tribution implied by the different social contracts. The opposite is true for the people. Hence
in this case the social contract is sustainable under both regimes.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Proof. For any {N, γ}, the relative income of the elite λEt is given by,
λEt =
w (At, N) + htr (At, N) + (n/γ) ρ (At, N)
w (At, N) + htr (At, N) + nρ (At, N)
:, (14)
where the factor rents are given by the expressions (3), (4) and (5). Computing the derivative
with respect to At one gets,
∂λEt
∂At
=
n
(
1− 1γ
)
[w′ρ− wρ′ + r′ρ− rρ′]
[w (At, N) + htr (At, N) + nρ (At, N)]
2 < 0
with primes denoting partial derivatives with respect to At. Negativity follows since w′ =
α(1 − α)[Atht + n]α−1ht > 0, r′ = α[Atht + n]α−1
(
1− (1−α)Atht+n
)
> 0 for large A, and ρ′ =
α(α − 1)[Atht + n]α−2 < 0 and γ > 1/2. Monotonicity after a certain level of development
follows from the change in sign in r′ and Lemma 3. From the fact that limA→∞ ρt (A,N) = 0
and noting the definition of λEt in (14) it follows that λ
E∞ = 1. Since nP = 0, similar reasoning
yields λ∞ = 1.
Next, consider the statement of Proposition 5 under the complementary parametric cases:
Proposition 5 (Development Path - Alternative Cases). For any {At,N,Ht, γ} the dy-
namics of the economy is characterized by:
(i) a sequence of oligarchic republic equilibria during early stages of development, followed by a
sequence of state of nature equilibria if g > g¯(γ);
(ii) a sequence of oligarchic republic equilibria during early stages of development, followed by a
sequence of democratic republic equilibria if g < g(γ).
Proof. (i) A similar reasoning as in the proof to Proposition 5 applies, given that initial inequality
is sufficiently high to support an oligarchic republic. But note that it follows from Propositions
3 and 4 that democratic republic is not an equilibrium if g¯(γ) = 1 − γ < g as the people
always have an incentive to deviate and arm in this case. But then, from Lemmata 3 and 4 and
condition (9) it follows that the development path is characterized by oligarchic republic in the
early stages of development, followed by a sequence of state of nature equilibria in later stages
of development.
(ii) Again, a similar reasoning applies, given that initial inequality is sufficiently high to support
33
an oligarchic republic. However, note that as direct corollary of Proposition 4, state of nature is
not an equilibrium if g < g(γ) since then ytg/γ > yEt and gy
E
t > yt in condition (8) cannot hold
at the same time. Hence, by monotonicity of λE , the economy experiences a direct transition
from oligarchic to democratic republic. The timing of the transition is undetermined in this case
as consequence of the possibility that a social contract can be sustained under both political
regimes. If the elite have the power to impose a political system, the democratic transition
occurs for lower levels of λEt , and thus during later generations because of Lemma 4, than if the
people have the power to impose a political system on the society. All other results concerning
the comparative dynamics remain unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. Rewrite the conditions that define t and t¯ in implicit terms as,
λEt γ − g = 0 and λEt¯ − 1/g = 0 , (15)
respectively. First note that n = N/L = N/1 and that
λEt =
yEt
yt
=
yt + nρt (1/γ − 1)
yt
= 1 +
nρt
yt
(1/γ − 1) .
Hence, because ∂(nρt/yt)∂n =
αAtht
(Atht+n)2
> 0 ∀t and monotonicity we know by applying the implicit
function theorem that
dA
dn
= −∂
[
λEt γ
]
/∂n
∂λEt /∂A
> 0 and
dA¯
dn
= −∂(λ
E
t¯ γ)/∂n
∂λE
t¯
/∂A¯
> 0 ,
and by monotonicity of A in t we have sign
(
dt
dn
)
= sign
(
dA
dn
)
and that sign
(
dt¯
dn
)
= sign
(
dA¯
dn
)
.
A similar reasoning applies for a change of the different timing with respect to inequality γ
for a given N .
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. Define t and t¯ in implicit terms as in the proof of Proposition 6 and note that sign(∂λEt¯ /∂A¯) =
sign(∂λEt /∂A) = sign(∂λ
E
t /∂At) < 0. Also note that ∂
[
λEt γ
]
/∂γ =
(
wt + rtht
)
> 0 and
∂λEt¯ /∂γ = −
(
n/γ2
)
ρ/y < 0. Moreover, by implicit differentiation we know that
dA
dγ
= −∂
[
λEt γ
]
/∂γ
∂λEt /∂A
> 0 and
dA¯
dγ
= −∂(λ
E
t¯ γ)/∂γ
∂λE
t¯
/∂A¯
< 0 .
Finally, by monotonicity of A in t we have sign
(
dt
dγ
)
= sign
(
dA
dγ
)
and that sign
(
dt¯
dγ
)
=
sign
(
dA¯
dγ
)
, which proves the claim.
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A.2 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: The Conflict Game
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Figure 2: Extensive Form of the Conflict Game
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Figure 3: A Simulation of the Development Path
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Figure 4: Simulation of the Development Path for Countries with Different γ
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Figure 5: Overtaking and Divergence: Simulation of the Development Path for Countries with
Different γ and N
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Table 1: Simulation: Parameters Values Used for Simulation
Base-line Specification
α = 0.5; β = 0.07; δ = 0.1;
ρ = 0.5; φ = 0.8; g = 0.62;
γ = 0.32; N = 20; A0 = 1;
Variation in γ
α = 0.5; β = 0.07; δ = 0.1;
ρ = 0.5; φ = 0.8; g = 0.62;
γ1 = 0.35; N = 20; A0 = 1;
γ2 = 0.28;
Overtaking and Divergence
α = 0.5; β = 0.07; δ = 0.1;
ρ = 0.5; φ = 0.8; g = 0.62;
γ1 = 0.35; N1 = 17; A0 = 1;
γ2 = 0.28; N2 = 23;
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